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Abstract—LTE-U is an extension of the Long Term Evolution
(LTE) standard for operation in unlicensed spectrum. LTE-U
differs from WiFi, the predominant technology used in unlicensed
spectrum in that it utilizes a duty cycle mode for accessing the
spectrum and allows for a more seamless integration with LTE
deployments in licensed spectrum. There have been a number
of technical studies on the co-existence of LTE-U and WiFi in
unlicensed spectrum In this paper, we instead investigate the
impact of such a technology from an economic perspective.
We consider a model in which an incumbent service provider
(SP) deploys a duty cycle-based technology like LTE-U in an
unlicensed band along with operating in a licensed band and
competes with one or more entrants that only operate in the
unlicensed band using a different technology like WiFi. We
characterize the impact of a technology like LTE-U on the market
outcome and show that the welfare impacts of this technology are
subtle, depending in part on the amount of unlicensed spectrum
and number of entrants. The difference in spectral efficiency
between LTE and WiFi also plays a role in the competition among
SPs. Finally, we investigate the impact of the duty cycle and the
portion of unlicensed spectrum used by the technology.
I. INTRODUCTION
Offloading traffic to unlicensed spectrum has been a vital
approach for wireless service providers (SPs) to meet the
ever rising demand for mobile data and retain control over
profit margins [2]–[4]. Indeed, in 2016, there was more mobile
data traffic offloaded to unlicensed bands than served in
licensed spectrum worldwide [5]. These trends are expected
to continue with 5G [6], [7] and have led to the development
of technologies for unlicensed access that are based on the
LTE technology that SPs utilize in licensed spectrum. The two
main examples of this are LTE in unlicensed spectrum (LTE-
U) and License Assisted Access (LAA). These differ in several
ways from the WiFi technologies that are widely used in
the same unlicensed spectrum. For example, both LTE-U and
LAA utilize LTE’s carrier aggregation capability to essentially
combine a SPs licensed and unlicensed spectrum. Moreover,
LTE-U differs in that it does not employ a listen-before-talk
(LBT) protocol as used by WiFi, but instead is based on a duty-
cycle based approach.1 This led to much interest in studying
the co-existence of WiFi and LTE-U from a technical point
of view, e.g. [9]–[18]. In this paper, we instead examine the
impact of such technology from market point-of-view. Namely,
we seek to understand the impact of a SP using a technology
This research was supported in part by NSF grants TWC-1314620, AST-
1547328 and CNS-1701921. Some results in the paper were presented at IEEE
INFOCOM, Paris, France, April 2019 [1].
1LAA does employ LBT, which is required in some parts of the world.
LTE-U was developed first and is being deployed in countries where LBT is
not required for unlicensed channel access. For example, T-Mobile launched
LTE-U in spring 2017 [8] to serve customers in many cities in the US.
like LTE-U on the competition with other SPs that utilize a
technology like WiFi.
We consider a scenario similar to that in [19], [20], where
SPs compete for customers by announcing prices for their
service (see also [21]–[26]). The customers select SPs based
on the sum of the price they pay for service and a congestion
cost that is incurred for using the given band of spectrum.
In [19], [20], the SPs compete by announcing one price for
service in an unlicensed band and a different price for service
in any licensed band that the SP may own. When the LTE-U
technology is adopted, we instead assume the SP can announce
a single price because of the seamless integration of LTE
technology on both the licensed and unlicensed bands. In our
model, the duty cycle mechanism of LTE-U is considered.
Under the duty cycle setting, the incumbent SP (with licensed
spectrum) is able to use both its licensed spectrum and a
portion of the unlicensed spectrum to serve customers when
the duty cycle is ‘ON’ while it can only use its own licensed
band when the duty cycle is ‘OFF’. In such a scenario, we
model customers as being sensitive to the average congestion
they experience across the whole duty cycle. In addition, LTE
on unlicensed spectrum can provide higher spectrum efficiency
than WiFi systems [27]. This is because LTE is a synchronous
system and adopts scheduling-based channel access instead of
contention-based random access [28]. In our model, we use
one spectrum efficiency factor to capture the difference while
ignoring other complicated technical differences between LTE
and WiFi.
We use α and β to denote the duty cycle and the portion of
unlicensed spectrum that are used for LTE-U, respectively. We
first consider α and β as fixed parameters, e.g. determined by a
regulator. For example, currently LTE-U channel bandwidth is
set to 20 MHz which corresponds to the smallest channel width
in WiFi and Qualcomm recommends that LTE-U should use a
period of 40, 80 or 160 ms, and limits the maximal duty cycle
to 50% [29]. We show that in the monopoly market, using LTE-
U hurts the SP’s revenue and social welfare. We then show that
when there are multiple entrant SPs in the market, adopting
LTE-U technology can help the incumbent SP to increase
revenue and also benefit social welfare when the bandwidth of
unlicensed spectrum is small. When there is only one entrant
SP in the market, we show that it is possible for LTE-U
technology to hurt the revenue of the incumbent. We also
investigate the impact of different spectral efficiency between
LTE and WiFi. We show that if the efficiency advantage of LTE
over WiFi is large, LTE-U may benefit the incumbent’s revenue
and customer welfare in different competition scenarios.
Then we consider α as a controllable parameter with
fixed β. We show that with multiple entrant competitors, the
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incumbent’s revenue increases with α while with one entrant,
the incumbent may prefer a small α. Finally, we consider
varying α and β while keeping the utilization of unlicensed
spectrum (αβ) constant. We show that when the unlicensed
bandwidth is small, the incumbent may prefer lower α and
higher β. But when the unlicensed bandwidth is large, the
incumbent may prefer a higher α and a lower β.
In terms of other related work, [30] also considers an
economic model of LTE-U and WiFi. In [30] the focus is not
on competition between LTE-U and WiFi providers (there is
only one licensed service provider) but rather on understanding
how LTE-U impacts the service selection of a finite number of
users, each with a “congestion tolerance” for the service they
select. In this work, WiFi is a free option that is congestible,
while the licensed service is not congestible but is available
at a cost. In [31], authors propose an auction based spectrum
sharing framework to investigate the possibility of cooperation
between LTE and Wi-Fi in the unlicensed band. The proposed
mechanism make SPs to explore the potential benefits of
cooperation before deciding whether to enter head-to-head
competition. In [32], the authors mainly focus on competition
instead of cooperation. They analyze the market impact when
the incumbent SP offers a bundle price for service on licensed
and unlicensed band to compete with entrant SPs. Different
from bundling services, this paper focus on the bundling of
spectrum, because LTE-U aggregates the spectrum directly,
which is able to provide more seamless service to customers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Our model is
described in Section II. We first consider the monopoly case
in Section III. Then we treat α and β as fixed parameters
in Section IV and compare the results with the monopoly
case and the model in [19], [20]. In Section V, we look at
how different spectral efficiencies impact the competition in
the market. In Section VI, we view α and β as controllable
variables and investigate their impact on the incumbent SP.
Some numerical results are shown in Section VII. Finally, we
conclude in Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a market with one incumbent SP and N
entrant SPs, where the incumbent SP uses a duty-cycle based
technology such as LTE-U. In the following we will simply
refer to this as LTE-U, though as noted previously this is not
intended to model every aspect of LTE-U. The incumbent SP
is assumed to possess its own licensed band of spectrum with
bandwidth B, while entrants have no licensed spectrum. There
is a single unlicensed band with bandwidth W that can be used
by both the incumbent and entrant SPs. When the incumbent
SP applies the LTE-U technology, it uses carrier aggregation on
the unlicensed band and operates in a duty cycle mode. When
LTE-U is in ‘ON’ mode, we assume that it is always using a
portion of the unlicensed spectrum so that entrant SPs are not
able to operate over this portion (e.g. due to LBT, the entrants
would sense the incumbents presence and not transmit). We
use α to denote the percentage of time that the SP aggregates
the unlicensed spectrum. We use β to denote percentage of
unlicensed spectrum that the incumbent uses when the duty
cycle is in ‘ON’ state, i.e., when LTE-U is ’ON’, the bandwidth
that the incumbent can use becomes B + βW .
The SPs are assumed to compete for a common pool of
infinitesimal customers by setting prices for their services.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the incumbent is
SP 1, and all the entrant SPs are indexed from 2 to N + 1.
The price announced by SP i is denoted by pi. The SPs serve
all customers that accept their price. The revenue of SP i is
then xipi, where xi is the customer mass that accept price pi.
As in [21], [22], [32], a SP’s service is characterized by a
congestion cost. The congestion that the customers experience
in a band is denoted by g(X,Y ), which is assumed to be
increasing in the total customer mass X on the band and
decreasing in the bandwidth used Y . Here, we assume a
specific form g(XY ), where g(·) is a convex increasing function
with g(0) = 0 and XY is the number of users per unit
bandwidth. When the incumbent SP applies LTE-U technology,
the congestion that the customers experience will vary across
the duty cycle. We assume that customers are sensitive to
the average congestion across the duty cycle.2 The average
congestion of customers served by the incumbent SP is then
given by
gˆin(x1) = αg
(
x1
B + βW
)
+ (1− α)g
(x1
B
)
.
The average congestion experienced by customers who choose
an entrant SPs is
gˆen(x) = αg

N+1∑
j=2
xj
(1− β)W
+ (1− α)g

N+1∑
j=2
xj
W
 .
Note that as in [19] [20], the congestion experienced in the
unlicensed band by a customer of an entrant SP is the same for
all entrants and depends on the total traffic across all entrants.
This is modeling the fact that the entrants are all employing
a technology like WiFi to share this band. Also note that we
assume that when the LTE-U duty cycle is on, the entrant can
only use the remaining (1− β)W of the spectrum.
As in [19], [20], we assume that customers seek to receive
service from the SP with the lowest delivered price, which
is given by the sum of the announced price and the average
congestion cost of that SP’s service. This captures the fact that
customers are sensitive both to cost of service and the quality
of service. Hence, for the incumbent SP, the delivered price
d1(p1,x) is denoted by p1 + gˆin(x1). For an entrant SP i,
i ≥ 2, its delivered price di(pi,x) is given by pi + gˆen(x).
We assume that customers are characterized by an inverse
demand function P (q), which indicates the delivered price at
which a mass of q customers are willing to pay for service.
As in much of the prior literature, we assume P (q) is concave
decreasing. Each customer is infinitesimal so that a single
customer has a negligible effect on the congestion in any band.
Therefore, given the announced price by the SPs, the demand
of service for each SP i is assumed to satisfy the Wardrop
equilibrium conditions [33]. In our model, the conditions for
2This is reasonable as over the time-scale that customer select SPs they will
receive service over many duty cycles.
the SPs are
di(pi,x) = P
N+1∑
j=1
xj
 , for xi > 0,
di(pi,x) ≥ P
N+1∑
j=1
xj
 , for ∀i.
The conditions imply that at the Wardrop equilibrium, all the
SPs serving a positive amount of customers will end up with
the same delivered price, which is given by the inverse demand
function. A Nash equilibrium of the game is one in which the
customers are in a Wardrop equilibrium and no SP can improve
their revenue by changing their announced price (anticipating
the impact this will have of the Wardrop equilibrium).
At an equilibrium, the customer surplus is defined as the
difference between the delivered price each customer pays
and the amount it is willing to pay, integrated over all the
customers, i.e.,
CS =
∫ Q
0
P (q)− P (Q)dq, (1)
where Q =
∑
j
xj . The social welfare of the market is the sum
of consumer welfare and the SPs’ revenue:
SW = CS +
∑
j
pjxj . (2)
III. MONOPOLY SCENARIO
We first examine a scenario in which there is only a
single incumbent and no entrants. Hence, the incumbent is
a monopolist and can use both the licensed and unlicensed
band. Our goal in this section is to show that for our LTE-U
model, such a monopolist would have no incentive to deploy
the new technology. This shows that in later sections when
the incumbent does deploy such a technology that it is due
to competitive factors and not an inherent advantage of the
technology.
In this section, we allow the incumbent to offer both service
using LTE-U (with a given α and β) and additionally an ”unli-
censed service” that uses the remainder of the unlicensed band
when the LTE-U duty cycle is off.3 This ensures that using
LTE-U does not reduce the amount of spectrum the incumbent
has access to. The incumbent’s revenue optimization is then
given by:
maxpl1,pu1 p
l
1x
l
1 + p
u
1x
u
1 (3)
s.t. pl1 + αg
(
xl1
B+βW
)
+ (1− α)g
(
xl1
B
)
= P (xl1 + x
u
1 ),
pu1 + αg
(
xu1
(1−β)W
)
+ (1− α)g
(
xu1
W
)
= P (xl1 + x
u
1 ),
pl1, p
u
1 ≥ 0.
Here, pl1 is the price the incumbent offers for serving x
l
1
customers using LTE-U; pu1 and x
u
1 are the corresponding
values for the unlicensed service. The first two constraints
enforce the Wardrop equilibrium conditions for these two
3In subsequent sections, the incumbent will only offer service using LTE-U
or unlicensed service, instead of this combination.
services. Note also that if we set α = 0 and β = 0, then
this reduces to a model as in [19] in which the incumbent does
not employ LTE-U and offers separate licensed and unlicensed
service.
Consider the expected congestion for the LTE-U service in
(3). Given the convexity of the congestion function g(·), we
have the following inequality:
gˆin(x
l
1) ≥ g
(
αxl1
B + βW
+ (1− α)x
l
1
B
)
∆
= g
(
xl1
Be
)
,
where Be denotes the equivalent licensed bandwidth given by
Be = B +
αβW
1 + β(1− α)W/B . (4)
Similarly, considering the congestion for the unlicensed ser-
vice, we have the equivalent unlicensed bandwidth We given
by
We = W − αβW
1− β(1− α) . (5)
Note that the congestion is no smaller than in a setting
where the incumbent offered separate licensed and unlicensed
services (without LTE-U) using the equivalent bandwidth and
equality holds when the congestion function g(·) is linear.
Based on this, we have the following result.
Theorem 3.1: In a monopoly scenario, the incumbent SP
can gain no additional revenue by using the LTE-U technology.
The detailed proof is in Appendix A. Notice that the
equivalent licensed bandwidth increases and the equivalent
unlicensed band decreases but the total amount of equivalent
bandwidth in (4) and (5) decreases when adopting LTE-U.
This is the reason that prevents the incumbent from adopting
LTE-U.
Theorem 3.2: In a monopoly scenario, both customer sur-
plus can social welfare decreases when LTE-U is adopted.
The detailed proof is in Appendix B. As a result of the loss
of equivalent bandwidth, customer surplus and social welfare
also decrease when LTE-U is used. Note that in this section,
we assume the spectral efficiency of LTE and WiFi are the
same. In Section V, we will see that different results emerge
when differences in spectral efficiency are accounted for.
IV. COMPETITION WITH FIXED α AND β
We now study the case where there is competition between
the incumbent and one or more entrants. We first consider the
case where there are multiple entrants and then consider the
special case of one entrant. In both cases we will see that
unlike the previous section, the incumbent may now have an
incentive to deploy LTE-U. Throughout this section we assume
that α and β are fixed.
A. One incumbent & multiple entrants
Initially, we assume that there N ≥ 2 entrants. Hence, these
entrants will compete with each other as well as the incumbent.
The presence of this competition yields the following result on
the entrants’ equilibrium prices.
Lemma 4.1: If there are at least two entrant SPs in the
market, in any Nash equilibrium every entrant SP i serving a
positive mass of customers must have pi = 0 and at least two
SPs must announce this price.
Lemma 4.1 is similar to a result in [19] where firms compete
in unlicensed spectrum without LTE-U, and so we omit the
proof. Essentially, since the entrant SPs are all offering the
same service due to sharing the same spectrum, they will be in-
centivized to compete the price for this service to zero. Hence,
all the entrant SPs get no revenue regardless of the incumbent’s
actions.4 A corollary of this result is that the incumbent would
have no incentive to offer a separate unlicensed service in
this setting as its price for this would also be zero. Based on
Lemma 4.1 we give the following result on the incumbent’s
revenue.
Theorem 4.1: Consider one incumbent and multiple en-
trants. Given a fixed α > 0 and β > 0, the following hold:
1) The incumbent SP announces a higher price and attracts
more customers when LTE-U is adopted. As a result the
incumbent SP gets a higher revenue.
2) The customer mass served by the entrant SPs decreases
when the incumbent SP uses LTE-U technology.
3) The total customer mass served by the incumbent and
entrant SPs is lower when LTE-U is adopted.
The detailed proof is in Appendix C. As in the previous
section, the use of LTE-U increases the equivalent licensed
bandwidth. However, now that there are multiple entrants
keeping the price on the unlicensed band zero, this benefit
to the incumbent is not offset with a loss due to the reduced
equivalent unlicensed bandwidth. Due to the improved service
by adopting LTE-U, the incumbent is able to announce a higher
price and at the same time attract more customers. This leads
to an increase in the revenue. However the delivered price will
increase, resulting in fewer customers served.
Theorem 4.2: Customer surplus with LTE-U is nonde-
creasing as the amount of unlicensed bandwidth W increases
but is always less than the consumer surplus achieved without
LTE-U.
Theorem 4.2 shows that adding more unlicensed spectrum
benefits customers while adopting LTE-U always hurts cus-
tomers when there are multiple entrant SPs in the market.
This is because increasing the bandwidth of unlicensed spec-
trum actually increases the amount of resources for both the
incumbent and entrant SPs. However, when LTE-U is used,
there is some loss in the total equivalent bandwidth and the
incumbent is able to increase its price, leading to a loss in
customer surplus.
So far we have seen that with multiple entrants, LTE-U
increases firm profits (namely those of the incumbent) but
decreases consumer welfare. We next consider the impact of
this technology on the overall welfare which includes both of
these factors. We first use a simplified example to gain insight
and then give a more general result.
4Note here we are ignoring any cost for offering service. If such a cost was
included the result would be that the price is competed down to cost, still
yielding zero profit.
Consider a homogeneous inverse demand function and
linear congestion cost, i.e., P (q) = T if q ≤ A, P (q) = 0,
otherwise, and g(x) = x. Here, A can be viewed as the size of
the market while T indicates the valuation of every consumer.
We then have the following result.
Theorem 4.3: With a homogeneous inverse demand func-
tion and linear congestion, if W ≤
√
A2+B2T 2−BT+A
2T , social
welfare will always increase when LTE-U is adopted for any
α, β > 0. Otherwise, social welfare can either increase or
decrease when LTE-U is adopted.
The proof is in Appendix E. Theorem 4.3 shows that under
the assumption of a homogeneous inverse demand function and
linear congestion, when the unlicensed bandwidth W is small,
adopting LTE-U is good for social welfare no matter what
α and β are. Note that in these cases, customer surplus is
always zero and all the social welfare comes from the revenue
of the incumbent SP. When W is beyond the threshold in
the theorem, it becomes unclear how social welfare changes
with LTE-U. It can depend on the choice of α and β. Also
note that the threshold bandwidth is an increasing function
of AT , which is the ratio between market size and customer
valuation. When there are more customers in the market or
the customer’s valuation goes down, the threshold goes up.
This means that there is a larger range of W for which
LTE-U increases welfare. This is because when there are
more customers, or the customers have a lower valuation, the
incumbent is incentivized to serve more customers to increase
its revenue.
The following results extend Theorem 4.3 to a general
inverse demand function and a general congestion function.
Theorem 4.4: Given a fixed B > 0, α > 0 and β > 0,
There exists some Wth > 0 such that when W < Wth
adopting LTE-U achieves a higher social welfare than that
without LTE-U. But when W is large enough, LTE-U always
hurts social welfare.
A linear approximation method as in [34] is used to prove
the theorem. When LTE-U is adopted, Theorem 4.2 shows
customer surplus decreases, which means the delivered price
should increase. When the bandwidth of unlicensed spectrum
is small, the increase in revenue of the incumbent is able
to compensate for the customer surplus loss, so that the
overall social welfare can increase. But when W is large, the
advantage of LTE-U may not be large enough to raise the
delivered price to make up for the loss of customer surplus,
which will result in a loss of social welfare. The detailed proof
is in Appendix F.
B. One incumbent & one entrant
We next consider the case with only one entrant. If only
this entrant is offering unlicensed service, then Lemma 4.1
no longer applies and so this case requires a separate analysis.
Before considering the impact of LTE-U, we first consider two
possible ways the incumbent SP could act without this tech-
nology: it could compete with the entrant to serve customers
on the unlicensed band or it could only serve customers on the
licensed band. We call the first case unlicensed sharing and
in this case, the results are the same as when an incumbent
without LTE-U competes with multiple entrants. We call the
second case licensed sharing; in this case, the entrant SP is
able to use the unlicensed spectrum exclusively. The objective
of each SP is still to maximize revenue while the Wardrop
equilibrium conditions are satisfied. To be precise, in the
licensed sharing case, the conditions for the entrant SP on
the new band become
p2 + g
(
x2
W
)
= P (x1 + x2) , if x2 > 0
p2 + g
(
x2
W
) ≥ P (x1 + x2) , otherwise.
We first give a brief result to compare the licensed sharing
and unlicensed sharing cases without LTE-U.
Lemma 4.2: In the case with one incumbent and one
entrant SP, both the incumbent and entrant SPs are able to
gain higher revenue with licensed sharing than with unlicensed
sharing.
Lemma 4.2 shows that rather than making the spectrum
unlicensed, both the incumbent and entrant would prefer that
it is exclusively licensed to the entrant SP. However, note that
if the incumbent has the option of unlicensed sharing, then this
will not be an equilibrium as it would always want to enter the
unlicensed market and capture some of the entrant’s revenue
(even though this would eventually lead it to earning lower
revenue).
Next we study of impact of LTE-U and in particular
compare this to the licensed sharing case (which as noted
above gives an upper bound on the incumbent’s revenue in
the unlicensed sharing case). In this subsection, we assume
a linear congestion function g(x) = x and inverse demand
function P (x) = 1 − x to simplify the calculations and give
some insights.
Theorem 4.5: With a linear congestion cost and inverse
demand, we have the following comparisons with licensed
sharing:
1) When B1−α <
4
3 , the incumbent SP can always gain higher
revenue with LTE-U. Otherwise, the incumbent can be
either better or worse off with LTE-U (depending on the
parameter values).
2) For any α, β ∈ (0, 1), there always exists some Wth, such
that when W < Wth, the incumbent SP can gain higher
revenue with LTE-U.
The proof is in Appendix G. Both statements in Theorem
4.5 give sufficient conditions to guarantee a larger revenue for
the incumbent SP with LTE-U. Equations (4) and (5) show that
LTU-U increases the amount resources of the incumbent and at
the same time reduces the amount of resources of the entrant.
Intuitively, this should lead to higher revenue for the incumbent
with LTE-U. The first statement in Theorem 4.5 shows that
this intuition holds when the incumbent’s licensed spectrum
is sufficiently small. However, when there is a large enough
amount of licensed spectrum, the incumbent SP may suffer a
loss in revenue with LTE-U. This is because the incumbent
can already serve a large amount of customers on the licensed
band and reducing the entrant’s resources causes it to reduce
the delivered price, lowering the incumbent’s revenue. The
second statement of Theorem 4.5 claims that as long as
there is not too much unlicensed spectrum, the incumbent
is always willing to adopt LTE-U, which yields a higher
revenue. That is because, when W is relatively small, using
LTE-U can decrease the equivalent bandwidth of the entrant
competitor, which increases the congestion on unlicensed band
significantly, giving an advantage to the incumbent SP. But
when W is large, the decrease of the entrants’ spectrum
resource does not have a significant impact on congestion. As
a result LTE-U can not increase the customer mass served by
the incumbent enough to compensate for the lowered price due
to competition. So the incumbent may not want to use LTE-U.
Fig. 1: The bandwidth regions where LTE-U is better and
worse for the incumbent’s revenue with α = 12 and β =
1
2 .
We use Fig. 1 to illustrate the region where the incumbent
SP can get more revenue with LTE-U. We choose α = 12
and β = 12 in the figure. When B and W lie below the
blue curve, the incumbent is better off with LTE-U. The red
dashed line represents B = 4α3 . The blue curve approaches
to the red line asymptotically when W → ∞. We can also
see that the unlicensed bandwidth threshold Wth is relatively
large compared to the threshold for licensed bandwidth (the red
dashed line). That means in most practical cases, the incumbent
SP would be willing to use LTE-U technology.
Note that when there is one entrant SP, using LTE-U
can yield lower revenue for the incumbent in the licensed
sharing case. However, in unlicensed sharing case, we have
the following result.
Theorem 4.6: When there is only one entrant SP and
unlicensed sharing is used, the incumbent always achieve
higher revenue with LTE-U.
This result follows Theorem 4.1 and Lemma 4.2. Detailed
proof is in Appendix H. The reason is that when unlicensed
sharing is used without LTE-U, the price on unlicensed band
is zero due to the competition between the incumbent and
entrant SP, which hurts the incumbent’s revenue. If LTE-U
is used, the incumbent does not compete with the entrant on
unlicensed band directly. Instead, the incumbent accesses the
unlicensed band through LTE-U. In this case, the service price
on unlicensed band is not zero and the incumbent gains more
revenue consequently.
Next we characterize the customer surplus in the case of
one incumbent one entrant SP.
Theorem 4.7: When there is one incumbent and one en-
trant SP, for any value of B, α and β, customer surplus is non-
decreasing with unlicensed bandwidth W . Also, there exists
some Wth ≥ B, such that when W ≤ Wth, customer sur-
plus decreases when LTE-U is adopted compared to licensed
sharing and when W > Wth, customer surplus increases.
The proof is in Appendix I. The first result in Theorem
4.7 is consistent with that in the multiple entrants case,
which shows customer surplus increases with the bandwidth
of unlicensed spectrum. The second result is slightly different;
it shows that LTE-U can hurt customer surplus when W is
relatively small but it is able to improve customer surplus
when W is large, while in the multiple entrants case, customer
surplus always becomes worse with LTE-U. The reason is that
when there is only one entrant SP, the price on the unlicensed
band is not zero, which means a certain amount of consumers
in the market are not served. When W is large and LTE-
U is used, the incumbent can use the additional unlicensed
spectrum to alleviate congestion without hurting the entrant
SP too much. As a result, more consumers in the market can
be served and customer surplus increases. Also note that when
W is relatively small, the loss in consumer surplus is balanced
out by the increase in the SP’s revenue.
However, when comparing to unlicensed sharing, the com-
petition between the incumbent and entrant drives the price
on unlicensed band to 0. As a result, the results in Theorem
4.2 still holds if the incumbent and entrant SP use unlicensed
sharing.
We next examine how social welfare changes when LTE-U
is adopted in the asymptotic case with W →∞.
Theorem 4.8: In the case with one incumbent and one
entrant SP, if W →∞, social welfare always increases when
LTE-U is adopted.
The proof is in Appendix J. Theorem 4.8 shows that in
the single entrant case, social welfare is higher with LTE-U
when there is a large amount of unlicensed spectrum. Recall
that in Theorem 4.4, we show in the case with multiple entrant
SPs, social welfare is better with LTE-U when the bandwidth
of unlicensed spectrum is small. The intuition is that with
multiple entrants, the price is competed to 0 on the unlicensed
band. As a result, the increment in revenue can only cover
the loss of customer surplus when a small mass of customers
are served in the market, which implies a small W . However,
in the single entrant case, the price is not zero, there can be
a larger amount of customers unserved in the market, which
leaves enough room for customer surplus to improve. When
W is large, the improvement of customer surplus can make up
for the loss of revenue by the SPs.
V. IMPACT OF DIFFERENT SPECTRAL EFFICIENCY
Compared to 802.11ac, LTE-U offers a higher spectral
efficiency due to features such as Hybrid ARQ and CSI
feedback [35], [36]. In this section, we examine the market
impact of these gains in different scenarios.
First, we look at the model used in the analysis. Without
losing generality, we assume the spectral efficiency of WiFi
is 1. We assume that the spectral efficiency of LTE is γ ∈
[1,∞).5 A higher spectral efficiency leads to lower congestion
5We also include any MAC layer efficiency gains in this “spectral efficiency”
term.
on the same band, which we model by scaling the bandwidth
on that band. As a result, the congestion experienced by
customers when using LTE-U is given by
gˆin(x1) = αg
(
x1
γ (B + βW )
)
+ (1− α)g
(
x1
γB
)
. (6)
And the resulting equivalent bandwidth of the incumbent SP
is
Be = γ
[
B +
αβW
1 + β(1− α)W/B
]
. (7)
The equivalent bandwidth of the entrant SP is still the same
as (5), because only LTE traffic is affected by γ.
A. Monopoly market
We again begin by looking at a monopoly market. In
Section III, we showed that the incumbent SP cannot gain more
revenue with LTE-U. But when spectral efficiency is different
between LTE and WiFi, this is no longer true as shown next:
Theorem 5.1: In a monopoly scenario, the incumbent SP
can gain more revenue by using the LTE-U if and only if
γ >
1 + β(1− α)W/B
1− β(1− α) . (8)
The proof is in Appendix K. This theorem shows that the
gain in spectral efficiency of LTE-U over WiFi, γ, is large
enough, then it is possible for a monopolist to gain more
revenue with LTE-U. The reason is that when γ is large,
serving customers with LTE-U leads to less congestion, which
allows the incumbent to serve more customers. We can also
look at equivalent bandwidth in (7). When LTE-U is used, the
increase of licensed equivalent bandwidth is multiplied by the
spectral efficiency γ. When γ is large enough, it is possible
for the total equivalent bandwidth to increase, which helps the
incumbent SP make more revenue. In this case, the incumbent
SP is wiling to use LTE-U instead of serving customers on
licensed and unlicensed bands separately.
Note that when α and β are fixed, the threshold of γ in
(8) increases with the ratio WB . This means that when W is
relatively small comparing to B, the incumbent is willing to
use LTE-U even if its advantage over WiFi is not as large.
However when W is relatively large, the incumbent prefers
serving customers on the two bands separately, because the
gain from serving all customers with LTE cannot make up for
the loss on the total equivalent bandwidth. When the bandwidth
of licensed and unlicensed spectrum is fixed, the threshold of
γ in (8) is decreasing with α. This shows that in a monopoly
market, the incumbent is more likely to use LTE-U if the
duty cycle is large. Moreover, the threshold of γ is increasing
with β. This means that the larger the portion of unlicensed
spectrum the incumbent is allowed to use, the less profitable
it will be for the SP to use LTE-U. This is because if β is
large, the congestion on unlicensed band can be very high
when the LTE-U mode is on, which causes a significant loss
on both amount of customers served and the revenue on the
unlicensed band.
The next result characterized LTE-U’s impact on customer
surplus and total welfare.
Theorem 5.2: In a monopoly scenario, both customer sur-
plus and social welfare increase when LTE-U is used if and
only if (8) holds.
The proof is in Appendix L. We see that the condition for
customer surplus and social welfare to increase is the same
as the condition for the incumbent’s revenue to increase. This
is because they all depend on the total equivalent bandwidth,
which only increases when (8) holds.
Recall that in Section III, customer surplus and social wel-
fare both decrease if LTE-U is used when there is no difference
on spectral efficiency between LTE and WiFi. However, if we
assume LTE a better spectral efficiency than WiFi, operating
LTE-U is able to increase the overall efficiency of spectrum
usage and consequently can be beneficiary to customer surplus
and social welfare.
B. Competition with multiple entrant SPs
Now we turn to the case where multiple entrant SPs
compete. We consider a linear model where the inverse demand
function is P (x) = 1 − x and the congestion function is
g(x) = x.
First we look at the incumbent’s revenue with multiple
entrant SPs.
Theorem 5.3: Consider one incumbent and multiple en-
trants. Given a fixed α > 0 and β > 0, when LTE-U is adopted,
for any γ, the incumbent SP always gets a higher revenue and
the customer mass served by entrant SPs decreases. Also the
revenue of incumbent SP increases with γ.
The proof is in Appendix M.As in Theorem 4.1 (when
γ = 1), LTE-U still results in an increase in the equivalent
bandwidth of the incumbent, which leads to an increase in its
revenue. For γ > 1, this advantage only increases and grows
with γ.
While the incumbent’s revenue behaves similarly for γ > 1,
the result on customer surplus behaves differently when con-
sidering γ > 1. LTE-U basically operates as LTE on a certain
portion of the unlicensed band. Thus, if LTE has a better
spectral efficiency, it is possible to serve more customers in
the market with the same amount of spectrum resources. As
a result, customer surplus can increase in this case, which is
different from the result in Theorem 4.2. We characterize the
customer surplus in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.4: In the case with multiple entrants with a
linear congestion cost and inverse demand function, for any
α and β, if B and γ satisfy the following conditions:
B ≤
(√
2− 1) (1− β + αβ)αβ
2 (1− β) , (9)
αβ − 2(1−K)B −√∆
4(1−K) ≤ γ ≤
αβ − 2(1−K)B +√∆
4(1−K) ,
(10)
where K = αβ1−β(1−α) , and ∆ = 2α
2β2−[2(1−K)B + αβ]2,
there always exists some Wth, such that when W < Wth,
customer surplus increases when LTE-U is used. Otherwise,
customer surplus always decreases if LTE-U is used.
The proof is in Appendix N. This theorem shows that when
licensed bandwidth is small and LTE has a relatively large
advantage over WiFi, using LTE-U can lead to serving more
customers. This also requires that the bandwidth of unlicensed
spectrum is small. Because if W is large, the loss on unlicensed
band can no longer be compensated by the increase in the
efficiency. Note that the threshold for γ in (10) shows that
the efficiency gain cannot be too large, because when γ is
too large, the incumbent serves a large amount of customers
even without LTE-U. There is no room for customer surplus
to increase when LTE-U is used.
For social welfare, the result in Theorem 4.4 still holds.
A very simple way to verify this is that when W is small,
it is possible to increase customer surplus by using LTE-
U. Since the incumbent’s revenue increases with LTE-U and
entrants always end up with no revenue, social welfare also
increases when LTE-U is used. In the case with different
spectral efficiency, it is possible to have customer surplus and
social welfare increase at the same time, which is not possible
when the spectral efficiency is the same.
C. Competition with one entrant SP
We next consider the case with only one entrant. We focus
on the licensed sharing case, where the entrant SP is able to use
the unlicensed spectrum exclusively unless the incumbent SP
uses LTE-U. We first look at how the revenue of the incumbent
changes when LTE-U is used.
Theorem 5.5: With a linear congestion cost and inverse
demand, when γB1−α <
4
3 , the incumbent’s revenue is higher
when LTE-U is used and is increasing with γ.
The proof is in Appendix O. Similar to Theorem 4.7,
when B is small, the incumbent is able to gain more revenue
with LTE-U. But the threshold of B decreases when we
consider a spectral efficiency advantage of LTE. The intuition
is again that when γ > 1, , the equivalent bandwidth of the
incumbent SP increases. When 4(1−α)3γ < B <
4(1−α)
3 , the
increased equivalent bandwidth helps the incumbent to serve
more customers to gain more revenue. In such a case, it is
possible that the increased equivalent bandwidth brought by
LTE-U reduces the revenue of incumbent, because it may
lower the delivered price due to a more intense competition
between the incumbent and entrant SPs. The theorem also
states that when the given condition holds, the incumbent’s
revenue increases with the spectral efficiency. However, when
the given condition does not hold, a higher spectral efficiency
may result in a loss of revenue.This is again caused by the
increased competition with the entrant SP.
Next we characterize the impact on customer surplus and
social welfare.
Theorem 5.6: In the case with one incumbent and one
entrant SP, both customer surplus and social welfare always
increase with γ.
The proof is in Appendix P. Although it is possible for the
incumbent to lose some revenue when γ increases, customer
surplus and social welfare always benefit from an increase in
spectral efficiency. This means that when there is a loss in
revenue for the incumbent with increasing spectral efficiency,
the gain in customer surplus is able to make up for the loss.
VI. IMPACT OF α AND β
The duty cycle, α, and the percentage of the band for LTE-
U use, β, are two important parameters to maintain fair and
efficient coexistence of LTE-U and other unlicensed spectrum
users. In this section, we investigate the impact of α and β in
both the cases with multiple entrants and with one entrant. To
simplify our analysis we again assume no spectral efficiency
gains (i.e., γ = 1) and again consider a linear model where the
inverse demand function is P (x) = 1− x and the congestion
function is g(x) = x.
A. Impact of duty cycle
First we consider when β is fixed and only vary the duty
cycle α to see its impact. We begin with the case of one
incumbent and multiple entrant SPs in the market. Before
proceeding with our analysis of varying the duty cycle, we
give the following proposition which characterizes the market
equilibrium in the assumed scenario.
Proposition 6.1: Assuming a linear inverse demand func-
tion and congestion function and multiple entrants, the equilib-
rium announced price of the incumbent SP and the customer
mass served is
p1 =
1
2(1 +We)
, x1 =
Be
2(1 +Be +We)
,
where Be and We are defined in (4) and (5) respectively. The
announced prices of entrant SPs are all zero and the total
customer mass served by the entrants is
wt =
We(2 + 2We +Be)
2(1 +We)(1 +Be +We)
.
This proposition shows that the equilibrium price can be
expressed with the equivalent bandwidth in (4) and (5). We
next investigate how the equivalent bandwidth Be, We and
their sum change with the duty cycle α.
Lemma 6.1: The equivalent bandwidth Be increases with
α and We decreases with α. If W > B1−β , for α ∈ (0, 12 ),
the total amount of equivalent bandwidth Be + We always
decreases with α.
The proof is in Appendix Q. This lemma shows that when
B is relatively smaller than W , the total equivalent bandwidth
decreases with α in the range (0, 12 ). As mentioned previously,
the duty cycle is usually limited below 50%. That implies that
in practice, the total equivalent bandwidth decreases with α.
Theorem 6.1: When there is one incumbent SP and multi-
ple entrant SPs, the revenue of the incumbent always increases
with the duty cycle α.
The proof is in Appendix R. Theorem 6.1 is a natural result
of Lemma 6.1. Because the incumbent SP gets more equivalent
bandwidth with LTE-U while the entrants lose more resources
with increasing α, the incumbent’s revenue should increase
with α. Consequently, if there is no limit for choosing α, the
incumbent SP may want to raise α to a value close to 1.
Things become different when we consider the case with
only one entrant SP in the market. In this case, Lemma 6.1
still holds, but the incumbent SP may not want to choose a
large α all the time. The following theorem describes such an
example.
Theorem 6.2: When there is only one incumbent and one
entrant in the market and W →∞, the optimal α for the in-
cumbent SP to maximize its revenue is α∗ = max{1− 3B4 , 0}.
The proof is in Appendix S. Theorem 6.2 shows that the
revenue of incumbent is no longer increasing with α when
there is only one entrant SP in the market. Fig. 2 shows how
revenue changes with α when B = 1, W →∞ and β = 0.2.
We can see the revenue of the incumbent reaches a maximum
when α = 14 and is higher than that without LTE-U. In the case
with one entrant SP, the incumbent SP may want to choose
a small α or even does not want to use LTE-U technology
(α∗ = 0) when there is plenty of licensed resource. Another
thing to notice is that when W → ∞, the optimal α is non-
increasing with licensed bandwidth B. This implies the more
licensed spectrum the SP possesses, the smaller duty cycle it
may prefer.
Fig. 2: Revenue of the incumbent in the case with one entrant
SP when B = 1, W →∞ and β = 0.2.
Next we look at the social welfare. Theorem 4.8 states that
in the case with one incumbent, one entrant and W → ∞,
LTE-U yields higher social welfare. We characterize the gap
between the two cases in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.3: When there is one incumbent and one en-
trant SP, if W →∞, the social welfare gap between the cases
with and without LTE-U is non-decreasing in α.
The proof is in Appendix T. Theorem 6.3 shows that when
there is a sufficient amount of unlicensed spectrum, a regulator
may prefer a larger duty cycle α, because it increases the total
amount of effective resources in the market, which results in
a larger increase in social welfare.
B. Fixed utilization ratio
In this section we fix the incumbent’s utilization of the
unlicensed spectrum, given by the product αβ. We then study
the impact of varying α and β keeping this product fixed for the
case of one incumbent and multiple entrants. We set αβ = k,
where k is a constant. We then view α as a variable in the
analysis. In this case, α can vary in the range (k, 1). The
equivalent bandwidths can be rewritten as
Be = B +
kW
1 + (k/α− k)W/B , We = W −
kW
1− (k/α− k) .
(11)
Note that both Be and We are increasing in α. As a result,
the total amount of equivalent bandwidth increases with α. But
it remains unclear what impact this has on the incumbent’s
revenue. The following theorem addresses this.
Theorem 6.4: In the case with one incumbent SP and
multiple entrant SPs under the linear setting, if αβ = k and k
is a constant in (0, 1), then:
1) If B >
√
2
2 and W ≤ B, the incumbent’s revenue always
decreases with α in the range (k, 1);
2) For any choice B, there always exists some Wth > 0 and
kth ∈ (k, 1), such that when W > Wth, the incumbent’s
revenue decreases with β in the range (k, kth).
The proof is in Appendix U. Theorem 6.4 shows that in
different situations, the incumbent SP has different preferences
on higher α or β when the product αβ is fixed. When the
bandwidth of the unlicensed spectrum is relatively small, the
amount of equivalent bandwidth increases with α, but the
revenue decreases with α. In this case, using a larger portion
of unlicensed spectrum is more profitable than using a small
portion for a longer time. However when W is relatively large,
the incumbent’s revenue decreases with β in some range,
which implies that the incumbent may prefer a larger α. In
this case, a small portion of the spectrum may be enough for
the incumbent to serve its customers. As a result a larger duty
cycle α might be more profitable for the incumbent SP.
Fig. 3 is an example of these two cases. We fix k = 0.2
and B = 1. We can see in Fig. 3(a), when W is relatively
small, the incumbent may prefer a lower α. But when W is
relatively large, the incumbent may prefer a higher α as is
shown in Fig. 3(b).
(a) B = 1,W = 1 (b) B = 1,W = 100
Fig. 3: Revenue of incumbent SP versus α with multiple
entrant SPs and k = 0.2.
Theorem 6.5: In the case with one incumbent SP and
multiple entrant SPs in the market, if αβ = k and k is a
constant in (0, 1), then customer surplus always increases with
α in (k,1).
From the expression of equivalent bandwidth in (11), we
know both Be and We are increasing with α, which implies the
total amount of equivalent spectrum resources increases with
α. So in this case, a higher α can help increase the amount of
virtual resources and serve more customers.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we give some additional numerical examples
illustrating our results. We again consider a model with a
linear inverse demand function and congestion function where
P (x) = 1 − x, g(x) = x. Both cases with fixed α, β and
varying α, β are considered.
A. Fixed α and β
First we examine how the incumbent’s revenue and social
welfare changes with the amount of unlicensed spectrum when
there is one incumbent SP and multiple entrant SPs in the
market. We fix the licensed bandwidth as B = 1 and set α, β
to different values. The results are shown in Fig. 4. As is
described in Theorem 4.1, the incumbent is always gaining
more revenue with LTE-U; this is illustrated in Fig 4(a). Also
we can see that when more spectrum can be used by LTE-
U, and a higher duty cycle is allowed, the revenue is higher.
The resulting social welfare is show in Fig. 4(b). We can see
that when the bandwidth of additional unlicensed spectrum
is small, social welfare increases slightly with the adoption
of LTE-U technology. But when more unlicensed spectrum is
released, social welfare decreases with LTE-U. Another thing
to notice is that social welfare decreases with W when W is
small. This effect is also mentioned for the case without LTE-
U in [19]. The use of LTE-U makes the social welfare loss
smaller.
(a) Revenue of incumbent (b) Social welfare
Fig. 4: Comparison of revenue and welfare versus W in the
case with multiple entrant SPs.
Next we look at the impact of different spectral efficien-
cies when there are multiple entrant SPs. We showed that
when spectral efficiency is not considered, customer surplus
is always worse with LTE-U, but it is possible to end up
with higher customer surplus when the efficiency difference is
considered. In Fig. 5, we show how customer surplus changes
with W while fixing B and γ. We can see that when W is
below a certain value, customer surplus increases with LTE-U.
However, for larger values of W , customer surplus is worse
with LTE-U.
Next we take a look at the case with one incumbent
and only one entrant SP in the market. We fix B = 5,
α = 0.5, β = 0.5 and assume that γ = 1 (i.e. there is not
difference in spectral efficiency). Results are shown in Fig. 6.
We also include the entrant’s revenue in Fig. 6(a). We can see
that when W is relatively small, the incumbent is able to gain
more revenue with LTE-U while the entrant SP suffers a loss in
revenue. However, when W is large, LTE-U hurts the revenue
of both SPs. The results for social welfare are shown in Fig.
6(b). We can see when W is large, social welfare increases
with LTE-U and there is a social welfare gap between the
Fig. 5: Customer surplus versus W with B = 0.01 and γ = 5
cases with and without LTE-U. Next, we let W →∞ and see
how this gap changes with B under different α (β makes no
difference when W → ∞). Results are shown in Fig. 7. We
can see that the social welfare gap first increases then decreases
with B and always increases with α. When B is small, LTE-
U is able to increase the amount of spectrum resources of
the incumbent SP to serve more customers, which benefits the
incumbent’s revenue and customer surplus and as a result leads
to a gain in the social welfare. However, when B is large, the
gap is smaller because both cases approach maximum possible
social welfare in the market so that the increase in resources
does not have as large an impact as when B is smaller.
(a) Revenue (b) Social welfare
Fig. 6: Comparison of revenue and welfare versus W in the
case with one entrant SP.
Fig. 7: Social welfare gap between the cases with and without
LTE-U as a function of α and B for W →∞.
B. Varying α and β
Next, we consider the impact of the duty cycle α with β
fixed when there are multiple entrants in the market. We have
already shown that the incumbent’s revenue increases with α
in Theorem 6.1. In Fig. 8, we show how social welfare changes
with α for different values of licensed bandwidth, unlicensed
bandwidth, and β. We can see that when W is small (Fig. 8(a)),
social welfare increase with the duty cycle α. In this case, a
higher α is desirable by both the incumbent SP and a social
planner. Also we can see that a larger β helps increase the
social welfare. But when W is slightly larger (Fig. 8(b)), social
welfare first decreases then increases with α. Additionally, we
can see that when β increases, social welfare decreases.
(a) B = 1,W = 0.1 (b) B = 1,W = 1
Fig. 8: Social welfare in the case with multiple entrants with
fixed β.
Next we show how social welfare changes with α when αβ
is fixed in the case with multiple entrant SPs. Results are shown
in Fig. 9. We can see in Fig. 9(a) that when W is relatively
small, social welfare first decreases then increases with α. That
is because there is some welfare loss when adding a small
amount of unlicensed spectrum to the market as is described
in [19]. Recall that the equivalent bandwidth of unlicensed
spectrum increases with α when αβ is fixed. As a result the
social welfare may suffer when α increases in the case of small
W . But when W is large as in Fig. 9(b), social welfare always
increases with α.
(a) B = 1,W = 0.2 (b) B = 1,W = 5
Fig. 9: Social welfare versus α in the case with multiple
entrants and fixed αβ.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyzed the market impact of LTE-U
technology on the competition among incumbent and entrant
SPs with licensed and unlicensed spectrum. We first analyzed
the case where the duty cycle, α, and the portion of unlicensed
spectrum that can be used by the incumbent, β, are fixed.
Our results show that when there are multiple entrant SPs
competing on the unlicensed band, the incumbent SP can
get more revenue by using LTE-U. However when there is
only one entrant SP in the market, the incumbent’s revenue
may decrease when LTE-U is adopted. We also show that the
welfare impact of LTE-U depends on the market parameters -
in some cases it can lead to a gain and in others a loss. We
also investigated the case where LTE-U has a better spectral
efficiency than WiFi. In general, the incumbent benefits from
the efficiency gain. When there are multiple entrants in the
market both revenue and customer surplus can increase when
LTE-U is used. We also investigated the impact of α and β
on the market. Our results show that when there are multiple
entrants and if β is fixed, the incumbent’s revenue increases
with α. However, when there is only one entrant SP using
unlicensed spectrum, the optimal α is not necessarily 1 and
can even be 0. We also fixed the product αβ to see whether
the incumbent prefers a high α or a high β. Results show
that when the unlicensed bandwidth is relatively small, the
incumbent prefers high β and when the unlicensed bandwidth
is relatively large, the incumbent may prefer high α.
There are many ways this work could be extended. Ex-
tensions include considering the investment costs for a SP to
upgrade to LTE-U, competition among multiple incumbents
and different types of customers.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
Proof: First, we claim that when congestion on both bands
decreases, the optimal revenue of the SP increases; this is
because the SP can just announce the same price and attract
more customers while keeping the potential to increase revenue
by adjusting its price. As a result we only need to show that
when the congestion level meets the lower bound, i.e., with
linear congestion cost, the incumbent SP can gain no higher
revenue than that without LTE-U.
We use the equivalent licensed and unlicensed bandwidth
to rewrite the optimization in (3).
max
pl1,p
u
1
pl1x
l
1 + p
u
1x
u
1
s.t. pl1 + g
(
xl1
Be
)
= P (xl1 + x
u
1 ),
pu1 + g
(
xu1
We
)
= P (xl1 + x
u
1 ),
pl1, p
u
1 ≥ 0.
For the optimization problem above, we can equivalently use
xl1 and x
u
1 instead of p
l
1 and p
u
1 as optimization variables.
From the first order conditions of the objective function
over xl1 and x
u
1 , we can show
xl1
Be
=
xu1
We
=
xl1+x
u
1
Be+We
, which
means the congestion levels on the licensed and unlicensed
bands are the same. Since we can verify Be + We ≤ B +
W , the total customer mass served becomes less when LTE-
U is applied. As a result, the revenue of the incumbent SP
decreases.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
In Appendix A, we show that in the monopoly case, the
congestion on the licensed and unlicensed bands are the same.
As a result the price for service on these bands must also be
the same. Thus, we can rewrite the problem in the following
form:
max
p
p1x1 (12)
s.t. p1 + g
(
x1
Be +We
)
= P (x1),
p1, x1 ≥ 0.
Again using x1 as the optimization variable, the first order
condition for optimality is
∂p1x1
∂x1
= x1P
′(x1) + P (x1)− g
(
x1
Be +We
)
− x1
Be +We
g′
(
x1
Be +We
)
= 0. (13)
Since P (x) is concave decreasing and g(x) in convex increas-
ing, the solution to (13) decreases when Be + We decreases.
Again using that Be + We < B + W , we conclude that the
total customer mass served decreases when LTE-U is used.
Next we show customer surplus is an increasing function
of the total customer mass served. Differentiating the customer
surplus in (1) with respect to the total customer mass served ,
x, yields
∂CS
∂x
= −xP ′(x).
Again, because P (x) is a concave decreasing function, cus-
tomer surplus, CS, is always an increasing function in the total
customer mass served. Therefore, customer surplus always
decreases if LTE-U is used.
Because both the incumbent’s revenue and customer sur-
plus decreases, the overall social welfare decreases as well.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
Proof: According to Lemma 4.1, we have pi = 0 for
i 6= 1 at equilibrium. Thus the game can be reduced to the
following optimization problem
max
p1
p1x1 (14)
s.t. p1 + hin(x1) = P (x1 + wt),
0 + hen(wt) = P (x1 + wt),
p1 ≥ 0,
where wt is the total customer mass served on the unlicensed
band and hin and hen denote the congestion associated with
the incumbent and entrant SPs respectively. When LTE-U is
adopted and α, β > 0, we have
hin(x1) = αg
(
x1
B + βW
)
+ (1− α)g
(x1
B
)
< g
(x1
B
)
,
hen(wt) = αg
(
wt
(1− β)W
)
+ (1− α)g
(wt
W
)
> g
(wt
W
)
.
In addition, because g(·) is a convex increasing function, we
have
∂hin(x1)
∂x1
<
∂g (x1/B)
∂x1
.
We then have the first order condition of revenue for the
incumbent SP
∂p1x1
∂x1
= x1P
′(x1 + wt)
∂(x1 + wt)
∂x1
(15)
P (x1 + wt)−
[
hin(x1) +
∂hin(x1)
∂x1
]
.
We use superscript (·)LTE−U and (·)un to denote the
quantity in the case with and without LTE-U technology re-
spectively. First we use contradiction to show that xLTE−U1 >
xun1 If we keep the selection of x1 = x
un
1 or choose
x1 < x
un
1 , base on the second equality constraint in (14)
and hen(wt) > g(wt/W ), we must have wLTE−Ut > w
un
t .
When wt decreases, the first order condition in (15) be-
comes positive, because we have hin(x1) < g(x1/B) and
∂hin(x1)
∂x1
< ∂g(x1/B)∂x1 . It implies that the incumbent SP can
still serve more customers to increase its revenue. Thus we
have xLTE−U1 > x
un
1 , which contradicts with our assumption.
As a result, we have wLTE−Ut < w
un
t , because otherwise
the second constraint in (14) will not hold, which proves the
second statement.
Additionally it can be verified that the total customer mass
should satisfy xLTE−U1 + w
LTE−U
t < x
un
1 + w
un
t so that the
first order condition in (15) can still be 0 when LTE-U is
adopted. It proves the third statement. Given the conditions
xLTE−U1 > x
un
1 , x
LTE−U
1 + w
LTE−U
t < x
un
1 + w
un
t , the
announced price p1 must increase to guarantee that the first
constraint in (14) still holds. Then the results on revenue in
the first statement follows.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2
Proof: We take derivative of customer surplus in (1) with
respect to the total customer mass served Q and get
∂CS
∂Q
= −QP ′(Q).
Because P (·) is a concave decreasing function, customer
surplus CS is always an increasing function of Q. Theorem
4.1 shows that when the incumbent SP adopts the LTE-U
technology, total customer mass decreases, which implies that
customer surplus also decreases.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.3
Proof: First we consider the case without LTE-U. This
case is analyzed in [22]; we summarize the key results next:
1) When W ≤ max{AT − B2 , 0}, customer surplus is zero
and
SW =
BT 2
4
; (16)
2) When max{AT − B2 , 0} < W ≤
√
A2+B2T 2−BT+A
2T ,
customer surplus is zero and
SW = (A−WT )
[
T − (A−WT )
B
]
; (17)
3) When W >
√
A2+B2T 2−BT+A
2T , we have positive cus-
tomer surplus and
SW = AT − A
2(B + 4W )
4W (B +W )
. (18)
We next show that in the first two cases, the adoption of
LTE-U increases the social welfare. Recall that with a linear
congestion function, LTE-U increases B to Be and decreases
W to We, where Be and We are defined in (4) and (5),
respectively.
In the first case, when we change B to Be and W to We,
since W−We > Be−B > 0, we always have We ≤ max{AT −
Be
2 , 0}. This implies that (Be,We) still falls in the region of
case 1), so that we can still use equation (16) to calculate
the social welfare. Obviously, when B increases to Be, social
welfare also increases.
In the second case, we claim that when LTE-U is adopted,
the equivalent unlicensed bandwidth We can never go beyond
the boundary
√
A2+B2eT
2−BeT+A
2T . Consider the following
function :
f(b) =
√
A2 + b2T 2 − bT +A
2T
.
Given that f(B) > W and W −We > Be −B, we have
f(Be) = f(B) +
∫ Be
B
f ′(b)db
> f(B) +
∫ Be
B
−1db = f(B)− (Be −B)
≥W − (W −We) = We.
So in this case, when LTE-U is adopted, Be and We can
only fall into case 1) and case 2). Since all of the social
welfare functions increase with B, it suffices to show that
when reducing W to We, social welfare is nondecreasing.
When fixing B, it can be shown that social welfare in (17) is
decreasing in W when W ≥ AT − Be2 and achieves maximum
BT 2
4 when W =
A
T − Be2 . Consequently, when decreasing W
to We, if it still falls in the range of case 2), social welfare
increases. If it falls into the range of case 1, it then becomes a
constant with respect to unlicensed bandwidth W . As a result
social welfare is nondecreasing when decreasing W to We.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.4
Proof: When W → 0, social welfare is the same with
and without LTE-U. In this limit, we have wt → 0 and x1 →
x∗, where x∗ represents the monopoly case optimal customer
mass. Note that here x∗ is a constant if B is fixed and can be
characterized by the following equation
x∗P ′(x∗) + P (x∗) = g
(
x∗
B
)
+
x∗
B
g′
(
x∗
B
)
. (19)
Consequently, when W → 0, we have SWLTE−U = SWun,
where SWLTE−U and SWun denote the social welfare with
and without LTE-U, respectively. Hence, it is sufficient to show
that lim
W→0
∂SWLTE−U
∂W > limW→0
∂SWun
∂W . Here, we use a linear
approximation method as in [34] to characterize the social
welfare for both cases when W → 0.
In both cases, differentiating the social welfare with respect
to W and letting W → 0 gives
lim
W→0
∂SW
∂W
= [−x∗P ′(x∗)] lim
W→0
∂x1
∂W
. (20)
Next we show how to calculate the value of lim
W→0
∂x1
∂W . First,
consider the case without LTE-U. In this case, the incumbent’s
revenue maximization problem can be transformed to the
following optimization formulation
max
x1
[
P (x1 + ∆w
un
t )− g
(x1
B
)]
x1, (21)
s.t. x1 ≥ 0,
where ∆wunt = g
−1 [P (x∗)]W is the customer mass incre-
ment on the unlicensed band as W → 0. Here g−1(·) is the
inverse function of g(·) and is well defined, because g(·) is an
increasing function.
The first order optimality condition for the optimization
problem (21) is
(x∗ + ∆xP1 )P
′(x∗ + ∆xP1 + ∆w
P
t ) + P (x
∗ + ∆xP1 + ∆w
P
t )
= g
(
x∗ + ∆xP1
B
)
+
x∗ + ∆xP1
B
g′
(
x∗ + ∆xP1
B
)
. (22)
Linearly approximating each term in (22) at point x∗ and
applying equation (19), we find:
∆xun1 =
[P ′(x∗) + x∗P ′′(x∗)] g−1 [P (x∗)]W[
2g′( x∗B )
B +
x∗g′′( x∗B )
B2 − 2P ′(x∗)− x∗P ′′(x∗)
] .
We can use similar method in the case with LTE-U
technology. The resulting ∆xLTE−U1 is
∆xLTE−U1 =
[P ′(x∗) + x∗P ′′(x∗)]h−1 [P (x∗)]W[
2g′( x∗B )
B +
x∗g′′( x∗B )
B2 − 2P ′(x∗)− x∗P ′′(x∗)
] ,
where h(t) is defined as
h(t) = (1− α)g(t) + αg
(
t
1− β
)
.
It can be seen that h(t) is also a convex increasing function and
has a well defined inverse function h−1(t). Since we always
have h(t) > g(t) for α, β > 0, we have g−1 [P (x∗)] >
h−1 [P (x∗)] > 0. By substituting these values back to equation
(20), we have
lim
W→0
∂SWLTE−U
∂W
> lim
W→0
∂SWun
∂W
.
Therefore, we can reach the conclusion that for some small
W , social welfare increases when LTE-U is used.
Next we show that when W is large enough, social welfare
decreases when LTE-U is used. From the definition of the
congestion function, we have lim
W→∞
g
(
w
W
)
= 0, because the
customer mass is always bounded. When LTE-U is used,
because both α and β are fixed, the average congestion on
the unlicensed band is
lim
W→∞
[
αg
(
w
(1− β)W
)
+ (1− α)g
( w
W
)]
= 0.
The Wardrop equilibrium conditions suggests the delivered
price is 0 in such a condition, which leads to 0 profit for the
incumbent SP. Then, from the definition of social welfare, we
have
lim
W→∞
SW = lim
W→∞
∑
j
pjxj = CS.
Theorem 4.2 states that customer surplus always decreases
when LTE-U is used. Hence, social welfare also decreases in
such a case.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.5
Proof: We first give the equilibrium of the incumbent SP
and entrant SP in terms of the equivalent bandwidth.
p1 =
2 + 2Be +We
4 + 4Be + 4We + 3BeWe
, x1 =
Be(1 +We)
1 +Be +We
p1; (23)
p2 =
2 +Be + 2We
4 + 4Be + 4We + 3BeWe
, x2 =
We(1 +Be)
1 +Be +We
p2.
When LTE-U is adopted, the spectrum resources of SPs
changes from B and W to Be and We respectively. It can
be verified that ∂p1x1∂We ≤ 0 for any pair of Be and We. Since
we have We < W , changing from W to We always increases
the revenue of incumbent.
The derivative of revenue with respect to Be can be written
in the following form
∂p1x1
∂Be
= T0
[
M0 + (28 + 10Be − 6B2e )W 4e + (4− 3Be)W 5e
]
,
where T0,M0 > 0. It can be verified that if 4 − 3Be > 0,
∂p1x1
∂Be
> 0 always holds. From (4), we know Be ∈ (B, B1−α )
for any α, β ∈ (0, 1). As a result, B1−α < 43 is a sufficient
condition for ∂p1x1∂Be > 0. Because adopting LTE-U increases
B to Be, it implies that the incumbent’s revenue increases
when B1−α <
4
3 holds.
To prove the second statement, we transform the derivative
to another form.
∂p1x1
∂Be
= T1
[
M1 +B
2
e (48 + 88We + 32W
2
e − 6W 3e )
+ Be(48 + 116We + 84W
2
e + 13W
3
e − 3W 4e )
]
,
where T1,M1 > 0. Since We < W , it is straightforward that
when W is small enough to satisfy 48+88W+32W 2−6W 3 >
0 and 48 + 116W + 84W 2 + 13W 3 − 3W 4 > 0, we always
have ∂p1x1∂Be > 0. As a result the revenue of incumbent increases
with LTE-U in this case.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.6
Proof: We use Theorem 4.1 and Lemma 4.2 to prove the
result. First, if the incumbent is allowed to use LTE-U and
also serve customers on unlicensed band, the result follows
Theorem 4.1, because both the incumbent and entrant SP are
competing on the unlicensed band, which drives the price to
zero. In this case using LTE-U yields higher revenue according
to the result in Theorem 4.1. Next, from Lemma 4.2, we know
that the incumbent gains higher revenue in the licensed sharing
case than unlicensed sharing with equivalent bandwidth Be and
We. Consequently, we conclude that the incumbent can gain
higher revenue with LTE-U than without LTE-U in the one
entrant unlicensed sharing case.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.7
Proof: In Appendix G, we give the equilibrium price and
customer mass served by the incumbent and entrant SPs in
(23). In this proof, we can still use those results. First we show
that customer surplus is non-decreasing with W . As is proved
in Appendix D, we only need to look at the total customer
mass served by SPs in the market, because customer surplus
is an increasing function on total customer mass served. We
have
∂(x1 + x2)
∂W
=
∂(x1 + x2)
∂We
∂We
∂W
+
∂(x1 + x2)
∂Be
∂Be
∂W
.
From (4) and (5), we have
∂Be
∂W
=
(αβB2)
(B + (1− α)βW )2 ≥ 0,
∂We
∂W
=
1− β
1− β(1− α) ≥ 0.
From (23), we have
∂(x1 + x2)
∂Be
=
2(1 +We)2(4 + 4We + 3W 2e )
(1 +Be +We)2(4 + 4Be + 4We + 3BeWe)2
+
B2e (8 + 16We + 9W
2
e )
(1 +Be +We)2(4 + 4Be + 4We + 3BeWe)2
+
4Be(4 + 10We + 9W 2e + 3W
3
e )
(1 +Be +We)2(4 + 4Be + 4We + 3BeWe)2
≥ 0,
∂(x1 + x2)
∂We
=
B2e (30 + 36We + 9W
2
e )
(1 +Be +We)2(4 + 4Be + 4We + 3BeWe)2
+
8Be(3 + 5We + 2W 2e )
(1 +Be +We)2(4 + 4Be + 4We + 3BeWe)2
+
6B4e + 8(1 +We)
2 + 4B3e (5 + 3We)
(1 +Be +We)2(4 + 4Be + 4We + 3BeWe)2
≥ 0.
As a result we conclude ∂(x1+x2)∂W ≥ 0 and consequently,
customer surplus is non-decreasing with W .
Next, we prove the second statement. We use xLTE−Utotal
and xuntotal to denote the total customer mass served with and
without LTE-U, respectively. We have
lim
W→0
(xLTE−Utotal − xuntotal) = 0,
lim
W→∞
(xLTE−Utotal − xuntotal) =
2 + 3Be
4 + 3Be
− 2 + 3B
4 + 3B
> 0.
Also we have
lim
W→0
∂(xLTE−Utotal − xuntotal)
∂W
< 0.
Additionally, it can be verified that there is a unique W > 0
such that ∂(x
LTE−U
total −xuntotal)
∂W = 0. Therefore, we can find
some threshold, such that when W is below the threshold,
∂(xLTE−Utotal −xuntotal)
∂W is negative and when W is above the thresh-
old, ∂(x
LTE−U
total −xuntotal)
∂W is positive. Note that limW→0
(xLTE−Utotal −
xuntotal) = 0 and lim
W→∞
(xLTE−Utotal − xuntotal) > 0. Also all terms
in xLTE−Utotal − xuntotal is continuous in W . Consequently, there
exists Wth, such that when W < Wth, xLTE−Utotal − xuntotal < 0
and when W > Wth, xLTE−Utotal − xuntotal > 0. Furthermore, we
have
(xLTE−Utotal − xuntotal)|W=B < 0.
So we can conclude Wth > B.
APPENDIX J
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.8
Proof: When W → ∞, we can find lim
W→∞
∂SW
∂B =
8+3B
(4+3B)2 ≥ 0 and limW→∞Be =
B
1−α . Adopting LTE-U expands
B to Be. Thus social welfare increases when LTE-U is
adopted.
APPENDIX K
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.1
Proof: In Appendix A, we show that in the monopoly
case, the congestion on the licensed and unlicensed bands are
the same. The revenue optimization problem is then in the
form of (12). Next, we show that the revenue of the incumbent
always increases with the total equivalent bandwidth, Be+We.
When the total equivalent bandwidth increases, the incumbent
can announce the same price and serve more customers, which
yields higher revenue. The solution to the optimization prob-
lem only makes the revenue even higher. So the revenue of the
incumbent always increases with total equivalent bandwidth.
Without LTE-U, the equivalent bandwidth is γB + W . With
LTE-U, the equivalent bandwidth is Be +We, where Be is in
(7) and We is in (5). Then by solving the inequality
γ
[
B +
αβW
1 + β(1− α)W/B
]
+W − αβW
1− β(1− α) > γB +W,
we get the condition that the incumbent’s revenue increases,
which is (8).
APPENDIX L
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.2
Proof: In Appendix B, we show that in the monopoly
case, customer surplus increases with the total equivalent
bandwidth. In Appendix K, we show that the incumbent’s
revenue increases with total equivalent bandwidth. Because
social welfare is the sum of incumbent’s revenue and customer
surplus, social welfare also increases with the total equivalent
bandwidth.
In Appendix K, we also show that the total equivalent
bandwidth increases if and only if (8) holds. Therefore, we
come to the conclusion.
APPENDIX M
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.3
Proof: For the first statement, the proof follows the same
steps as the proof of Theorem 4.1 in Appendix C. Those
arguments still hold because for any γ ≥ 1, the equivalent
licensed bandwidth increases and the equivalent unlicensed
bandwidth decreases when LTE-U is used.
The second statement can be proved by finding the equilib-
rium revenue assuming a linear inverse demand function and
congestion function. Since all entrant SPs announce zero price
in equilibrium, the optimization problem for the incumbent SP
can be written as
max
p1
p1x1 (24)
s.t. p1 +
x1
Be
= 1− (x1 + wt),
0 +
wt
We
= 1− (x1 + wt),
p1 ≥ 0.
The resulting equilibrium price and customer mass is
p1 =
1
2(1 +We)
, x1 =
Be
2(1 +Be +We)
.
It can be seen that p1 is irrelevant to Be and ∂x1∂Be > 0. Hence
the incumbent’s revenue increases with Be. Because Be in
(7) also increases with γ. We conclude that the revenue of
incumbent SP increases with γ.
APPENDIX N
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.4
Proof: To characterize the behavior of customer surplus,
we look at the total customer mass served in the market.
Because it is proved in Appendix D that customer surplus is an
increasing function in the total customer mass, we only need
to look at the total customer mass.
We use xLTE−Utotal and x
un
total to denote the total customer
mass served with and without LTE-U, respectively. By solving
the optimization problem in 24, we can find the total customer
mass
xuntotal = 1−
1
2(1 +W )
− 1
2(1 + γB +W )
, (25)
xLTE−Utotal = 1−
1
2(1 +We)
− 1
2(1 +Be +We)
, (26)
where Be and We are defined in (7) and (5), respectively.
We look at the difference between xLTE−Utotal and x
un
total. It
can be seen that
lim
W→∞
(xLTE−Utotal − xuntotal) = 0. (27)
Also we can write the derivative of the difference in the
following form:
∂(xLTE−Utotal − xuntotal)
∂W
= − 1
2(1 +W )2
− 1
2(1 + γB +W )2
(28)
+
K
2(1 +KW )2
+
K
2(1 + γB +KW )2
,
where K = αβ1−β(1−α) < 1 and is irrelevant to W . It
can be seen from (28) that lim
W→0
∂(xLTE−Utotal −xuntotal)
∂W < 0 and
lim
W→∞
∂(xLTE−Utotal −xuntotal)
∂W = 0.
Additionally we need to examine when the derivative in
(28) reaches 0. We can rewrite it in the following form:
∂(xLTE−Utotal − xuntotal)
∂W
=
 1
2( 1√
K
+
√
KW )2
− 1
2(1 +W )2

+
 1
2( 1+γB√
K
+
√
KW )2
− 1
2(1 + γB +W )2

∆
= A1 + A2. (29)
Note that when W ≤ 1√
K
, both A1 and A2 in (29) are negative
and when W ≥ 1+γB√
K
, both A1 and A2 are positive. Since
A1 and A2 are continuous functions of W , there must exist
some W ∈ ( 1√
K
, 1+γB√
K
) to make (29) zero. Also note that
A1 is increasing with W and A2 is decreasing with W , when
W ∈ ( 1√
K
, 1+γB√
K
). The W to make (29) zero is unique.
Thus, ∂(x
LTE−U
total −xuntotal)
∂W is smaller than 0 when W is
below a certain threshold value and greater than 0 when
W is above the threshold value. Therefore, the difference
(xLTE−Utotal −xuntotal) first decreases when W is below the thresh-
old value and then increases when W is above the threshold
value. Combining with (27), we can argue that if W is above
the threshold value, we have xLTE−Utotal − xuntotal ≤ 0. And if
lim
W→0
(xLTE−Utotal − xuntotal) ≤ 0, we have xLTE−Utotal − xuntotal ≤ 0
for all W > 0. Otherwise we can find some Wth such that
when W < Wth, (xLTE−Utotal − xuntotal) > 0.
Next, we need to find the conditions for lim
W→0
(xLTE−Utotal −
xuntotal) > 0. We have
lim
W→0
(xLTE−Utotal − xuntotal) (30)
= −2(1−K)γ2 + [αβ − 2(1−K)B] γ − (1−K)B2,
where K = αβ1−β(1−α) . We view (30) as a quadratic function
of γ. The discriminant is given by
∆ = 2α2β2 − [2(1−K)B + αβ]2 . (31)
To guarantee there exists real value γ to make (30) greater
than 0, we need ∆ ≥ 0, which gives us the condition in (9).
Solving the inequality lim
W→0
(xLTE−Utotal − xuntotal) ≥ 0 gives us
the condition in (10). That completes the proof.
APPENDIX O
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.5
Proof: In the case linear congestion cost and inverse
demand, we can find the equilibrium price and customer mass
served in the market. Following the steps in Appendix G, we
know that if 4 − 3Be > 0, we have ∂p1x1∂Be > 0 and conse-
quently, the incumbent’s revenue always increases when LTE-
U is used. When γ is considered, we have Be ∈ (γB, γB1−α )
for any α, β ∈ (0, 1). As a result, γB1−α < 43 is a sufficient
condition for the incumbent’s revenue to increase with LTE-
U.
Additionally, when γB1−α <
4
3 , we have
∂p1x1
∂γ
=
∂p1x1
∂We
∂We
∂γ
+
∂p1x1
∂Be
∂Be
∂γ
=
∂p1x1
∂Be
∗
[
B +
αβW
1 + β(1− α)W/B
]
≥ 0.
Therefore, incumbent’s revenue always increases with γ when
γB
1−α <
4
3 .
APPENDIX P
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.6
Proof: We first show that the total customer mass x1 +x2
increases with γ. We have
∂x1 + x2
∂γ
=
∂x1 + x2
∂We
∂We
∂γ
+
∂x1 + x2
∂Be
∂Be
∂γ
=
∂x1 + x2
∂Be
∗
[
B +
αβW
1 + β(1− α)W/B
]
.
We also have
∂(x1 + x2)
∂Be
=
2(1 +We)2(4 + 4We + 3W 2e )
(1 +Be +We)2(4 + 4Be + 4We + 3BeWe)2
+
B2e (8 + 16We + 9W
2
e )
(1 +Be +We)2(4 + 4Be + 4We + 3BeWe)2
+
4Be(4 + 10We + 9W 2e + 3W
3
e )
(1 +Be +We)2(4 + 4Be + 4We + 3BeWe)2
≥ 0
Consequently, we conclude that customer surplus increases
with γ.
With linear case inverse demand function and congestion
function, social welfare can be expressed as
SW = p1x1 + p2x2 +
(x1 + x2)2
2
. (32)
Differentiating SW with γ yields
∂SW
∂γ
=
∂SW
∂We
∂We
∂γ
+
∂SW
∂Be
∂Be
∂γ
=
∂SW
∂Be
∗
[
B +
αβW
1 + β(1− α)W/B
]
.
Additionally, we have
∂SW
∂Be
=
4(1 +We)
3(4 + 8We + 3W
2
e + 2W
3
e )
((1 + Be +We)3(4 + 4Be + 4We + 3BeWe)3
+
2B4e(16 + 42We + 35W
2
e + 9W
3
e )
((1 + Be +We)3(4 + 4Be + 4We + 3BeWe)3
+
Be(1 +We)
2(80 + 188We + 128W
2
e + 37W
3
e + 3W
4
e )
((1 + Be +We)3(4 + 4Be + 4We + 3BeWe)3
+
B3e(112 + 356We + 398W
2
e + 179W
3
e + 24W
4
e )
((1 + Be +We)3(4 + 4Be + 4We + 3BeWe)3
+
3B2e(48 + 180We + 252W
2
e + 161W
3
e + 44W
4
e + 3W
5
e )
((1 + Be +We)3(4 + 4Be + 4We + 3BeWe)3
.
We can see that all terms in ∂SW∂Be are positive. Therefore,
social welfare increases with γ as well.
APPENDIX Q
PROOF OF LEMMA 6.1
Proof: The first statement can be proved by taking deriva-
tive of (4) and (5) with respect to α. For the second one, we
need to calculate the derivative of Be +We with respect to α.
When W > B1−β , we have the following inequality
∂(Be +We)
∂α
<
β2(1 +W/B)W [2α− 1]
[1 + (1− α)βW/B]2[1− (1− α)β]2 .
It implies that when α < 12 ,
∂(Be+We)
∂α < 0. As a result,
Be +We will decrease with α in (0, 12 ).
APPENDIX R
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.1
Proof: According to Lemma 6.1 , Be increases with α and
We decreases with α. When α increases, if the incumbent still
announces the same price it is able to attract more consumers
due to the decrease on congestion on licensed band. When
there are multiple entrants, the entrants’ strategy is announcing
0 price regardless of the bandwidth of licensed and unlicensed
band. In this case, the incumbent can still adjust its price to
gain more revenue. That concludes our proof.
APPENDIX S
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.2
Proof: We first use best response function to calculate
the equilibrium price and customer mass with W → ∞. The
results are as following
p1 =
1
4 + 3Be
, x1 =
Be
4 + 3Be
,
p2 =
2
4 + 3Be
, x2 =
1 +Be
4 + 3Be
.
We can find the revenue of incumbent
p1x1 =
Be
(4 + 3Be)2
=
1
16
Be
+ 9Be + 24
(33)
We can see that (33) increases in the interval [0, 43 ] and reaches
maximum when Be = 43 . We also have limW→∞
Be =
B
1−α . As
a result, the optimal α = max{1− 3B4 , 0}.
APPENDIX T
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.3
Proof: In this case, we have already shown that social wel-
fare increases with Be in the proof of Theorem 4.8. The social
welfare gap can be denoted as Gap = SW (Be) − SW (B).
Since lim
W→∞
Be =
B
1−α , we can conclude that the social
welfare gap is non-decreasing with α.
APPENDIX U
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.4
Proof: Because αβ = k, we can replace k/α by β in
(11). In order to prove the statement 1), we just need to prove
revenue increases with β under the given condition. We first
find the derivative of the revenue p1x1 with respect to β.
∂p1x1
∂β
=
∂Be
∂β (1 + 2We +W
2
e )− ∂We∂β (B2e + 2Be + 2BeWe)
4(1 +We)2(1 +Be +We)2
.
For statement 1), suppose W ≤ B, we can verify that ∂We∂β ≤
∂Be
∂β < 0. Thus we can find the sufficient condition for the
derivative of revenue to be non-negative.
(B2e + 2Be + 2BeWe)− (We + 1)2
= (1 +Be +We)
2 − 2(1 +We)2 ≥ 0
By solving the inequality, we can find the sufficient condition
for the revenue to increase with β ∈ (k, 1) is B ≥
√
2
2 and
W ≤ B.
Then we prove statement 2). We only need to find the
condition such that lim
β→k
∂p1x1
∂β < 0. We have
lim
β→k
∂p1x1
∂β
= C0 [(B + kW )(B + kW + 2(1− k)W + 2)
− [1 + (1− k)W ]2W/B] ,
where C0 is a positive component. We can as a result find the
sufficient condition
W
B
>
(B + kW )(B + kW + 2(1− k)W + 2)
[1 + (1− k)W ]2 (34)
Note that for any choice of B, LHS of (34) is increasing
linearly with respect to W and RHS will increase to some
constant when W is large, because the most significant parts
of the numerator and denominator are W 2. As a result, there
must exist some Wth such that when W > Wth, inequality
(34) holds. Then we can reach the conclusion.
